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Wills, Trusts & Administration of
Estates
by Mary F. Radford*
This Article summarizes the major cases and legislative enactments
relating to Georgia fiduciary law during the period from June 1, 1999
through May 31, 2000. Many of the cases described in this Article were
decided under Georgia's Probate Code as it existed prior to the extensive
revisions that became effective on January 1, 1998. References in this
Article to former code sections will refer to the pre-1998 Probate Code,
and all other references will be to the Revised Probate Code of 1998.'
I.

RECENT DECISIONS

A.

Constructionof Wills
Two significant cases decided during the reporting period dealt with
the construction of provisions in wills. The construction of the terms of
the will in Emmertz v. Cherry2 had dramatic federal estate tax ramifications for the beneficiaries of the will. In this case the Georgia Supreme
Court found the testator had waived his executor's right to seek
reimbursement from the beneficiary of a life insurance policy for the
federal estate taxes incurred as a result of the inclusion of the life
insurance proceeds in the testator's gross estate.3 Thus, the tax was
* Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law. Newcomb College of

Tulane University (B.A. 1974); Emory University (J.D., 1981). Member, State Bar of
Georgia. Reporter, Probate Code Revision Committee and Guardianship Code Revision

Committee, Fiduciary Law Section of the State Bar of Georgia.
1. O.C.G.A. §§ 53-1-1 to 53-11-11 (1997 & Supp. 2000). The revised code may be

officially cited as the "Revised Probate Code of 1998." O.C.G.A. § 53-1-1 (Supp. 2000).
2. 271 Ga. 458, 520 S.E.2d 219 (1999).
3. Id. at 459, 520 S.E.2d at 220. For purposes of this discussion, the term "gross

estate" is used to indicate the estate of the decedent, as defined by the federal estate tax
laws, which is used as the basis for the federal estate tax computation. I.R.C. § 2031
(1982). As will be noted in this discussion, the value of a decedent's gross estate may
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paid from the residue of the testator's estate. The tax was incurred
because the testator died with "incidents of ownership" in three life
insurance policies, all of which were payable to his daughter.4 The
testator's daughter and two sons were the beneficiaries of the residue of
the testator's estate, and the will directed that all taxes be paid from the
residue of the estate. Another item in the will directed the executor to
recover from the recipients of any qualified terminable interest
property5 or property distributed under a power of appointment s the
share of the estate taxes attributable to the inclusion of the value of that
property in the testator's gross estate. This clause did not mention
reimbursement from recipients of life insurance proceeds.7 However,
section 2206 of the Internal Revenue Code entitles the executor to
recover taxes attributable to life insurance proceeds from the life
insurance beneficiary "[u]nless the decedent directs otherwise in his

include the value of property that is not part of the probate estate - that is, of property to
which the decedent does not have actual title at death. Such nonprobate property (e.g., life
insurance proceeds) passes to the ultimate recipient without ever coming into the hands

of the executor or under the jurisdiction of the probate court.

However, if an estate is

subject to the federal estate tax, the executor of the estate must pay the tax. I.R.C. § 2002
(1982).
4. The Internal Revenue Code provides that a decedent's gross estate shall include the
value of any proceeds of any life insurance policy "with respect to which the decedent
possessed at his death any of the incidents of ownership." I.R.C. § 2042(2) (1982).
5. The Internal Revenue Code defines "qualified terminable interest property"
(hereinafter "QTIP") as property from which a decedent's surviving spouse is entitled to all
the income, payable at least annually, and which may not be appointed to anyone other
than the surviving spouse. I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7) (1982). Thus, this is not property that the
surviving spouse receives outright, but rather property that is available to the spouse
during the spouse's life, with any property remaining at the spouse's death passing
according to the direction in the original decedent's will. The value of QTIP property may

be deducted from the decedent's gross estate, thus reducing the amount of estate tax due
at the decedent's death. Id. § 2056(a). Because this property is treated as having passed
to the surviving spouse (even though it does not actually do so), the value of the property
is then included in the estate of the surviving spouse for tax purposes, although it does not
constitute part of the spouse's probate estate. Id. § 2044. Because the QTIP property is
not in the spouse's probate estate, the Internal Revenue Code allows the executor to
recover from the recipient of the property the value of the tax attributable to the inclusion
of that property in the gross estate, unless the spouse indicates otherwise by will. Id.
§ 2207A.
6. If a decedent dies owning property over which the decedent has a general power of
appointment (that is, the unrestricted power to designate the ultimate recipients), the
value of the property that is subject to the power is included in the decedent's gross estate
even if, by reason of the exercise of that power, the property is not included in the
decedent's probate estate. Id. § 2041. Unless the decedent directs otherwise by will, the
executor may recover from the recipients of that property the value of any estate taxes that
are accrued due to the inclusion of the property in the decedent's gross estate. Id. § 2207.
7. 271 Ga. at 458-59, 520 S.E.2d at 220.
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will. " ' The probate court found the direction to pay all taxes from the
residue, combined with inclusion of a clause that directed the executor
to recover taxes from the recipients of certain nonprobate assets and the
omission of a similar clause related to life insurance beneficiaries,
illustrated the testator's awareness of the possibility that tax would be
generated by nonprobate assets.9 The probate court concluded these
terms constituted a direction in the will that the executor not recover
taxes from the life insurance beneficiary.' ° The supreme court affirmed.11
In Crisp Area YMCA v. Nationsbank, N.A., the Georgia Supreme
Court adopted the plain meaning of the words of the will over somewhat
compelling evidence that the testator's intent was otherwise. 3 The
testator in this case was a founding director of the Cordele YMCA and
was also an active member of the Albany YMCA, whose facility he used
several times a week. He made financial contributions to both organizations. The Cordele YMCA became inactive in May 1992 and performed
no functions from that time other than liquidating its assets and paying
its debts.'4 The directors of that YMCA had invited the Albany YMCA
to take control of activities in Crisp County, and the Albany YMCA
complied. 5
On May 14, 1992, six days after the Cordele YMCA ceased operation,
the testator executed a will in which he bequeathed $100,000 to the
Cordele YMCA. In 1994 he twice instructed his attorney to draft a
codicil changing the beneficiary to the Albany YMCA, but he never
executed those codicils. He died on June 21, 1995. The executor sought
declaratory judgment, and the trial court, applying the doctrine of cy
pres, ordered that money be paid to the Albany YMCA.' 6 The doctrine
of cy pres was described in the former Probate Code as follows:

8. I.R.C. § 2206 (1982).
9. 271 Ga. at 459-60, 520 S.E.2d at 220-21.
10. Id. at 458-59, 520 S.E.2d at 220.
11. Id. at 460, 520 S.E.2d at 221. Because this was a case of first impression in
Georgia, the probate court turned to cases from other states for direction. The supreme
court agreed with the probate court's citation of an Arizona case, Estate of Tovrea v. Nolan,
845 P.2d 494 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992), as an apt comparison. 271 Ga. at 460, 520 S.E.2d at
221.
12. 272 Ga. 182, 526 S.E.2d 63 (2000).
13. Id. at 184-85, 526 S.E.2d at 65-66.
14. Id. at 183, 526 S.E.2d at 64. Apparently the Cordele YMCA also lost its tax-exempt
status. See id.
15. Id. at 182-83, 526 S.E.2d at 64.
16. Id.
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A devise or bequest to a charitable use will be sustained and carried
out in this state. In all such cases, when there is a general intention
manifested by the testator to effect a certain purpose and the particular mode in which he directs it to be done fails from any cause, the
superior court, utilizing its equitable powers, may effectuate by
approximation the purpose in a manner most similar to that indicated
by the testator.17
The trial court apparently determined that distribution of the money to
an inactive organization would thwart the testator's intent to make a
charitable 8 gift and thus redirected the funds to the organization's
successor.1
The supreme court reversed the trial court, holding that cy pres can
be applied only when there is a "legal or practical impossibility of
carrying into effect" the decedent's intent. 9 Although the Cordele
YMCA was no longer active, the court noted that it was not defunct and
that the testator was aware of its status.20 In dissent Justices Sears
and Benham found the testator's will evidenced an intent to bequeath
a charitable gift to a Crisp County regional YMCA organization.2 '
B.

Lack of Testamentary Capacity and Undue Influence

In several cases decided during the reporting period, the Supreme
Court of Georgia affirmed its insistence on a stringent standard of
evidence before finding a lack of testamentary capacity or undue
influence and thus depriving a testator of the right to make a will.22
These cases shared a basic fact pattern: A testator disinherited some
family members in favor of one or more other family members. The
family members who took under the will were in close contact with the
testator in each case and thus, theoretically, had the opportunity to exert

17. Former O.C.G.A. § 53-2-99 (1997). The Revised Probate Code defines the doctrine
as follows: "Ifa testamentary gift to a charity cannot be executed in the exact manner
provided by the testator, the superior court may exercise equitable powers in such a way
as will as nearly as possible effectuate the intention of the testator." Id. § 53-4-62.
18. 272 Ga. at 182-83, 526 S.E.2d at 64.
19. Id. at 183, 526 S.E.2d at 64.
20. Id. at 183-84, 526 S.E.2d at 65.
21. Id. at 186, 526 S.E.2d at 66 (Sears, J., dissenting).
22. See Dyer v. Souther, 272 Ga. 263, 264-66, 528 S.E.2d 242, 245 (2000); KendrickOwens v. Julian, 271 Ga. 731, 732-33, 524 S.E.2d 237, 237-38 (1999); Brooks v. Julian, 271
Ga. 766, 768-70, 523 S.E.2d 862, 864-65 (1999); In re Estate of Diaz, 271 Ga. 742, 743-45,
524 S.E.2d 219, 221-22 (1999); Crumbley v. McCart, 271 Ga. 274, 276, 517 S.E.2d 786, 78788 (1999).
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undue influence. 2' However, in most of these cases, the supreme court
found that the close relationship between the testator and the family
member was not enough to sustain a finding of undue influence.24 In
many of the cases, the testator showed some signs of mental frailty.25
On the issue of testamentary capacity, the court concentrated on the
time the will was actually executed and looked closely at the evidence of
professionals, such as the testator's physician or attorney, to determine
whether the testator had capacity at that time.26
In Crumbley v. McCart,27 the supreme court discussed the circumstances under which a relationship between brothers would rise to the
level of a confidential relationship and thus result in a rebuttable
presumption of undue influence by the surviving brother.2" The
brothers in this case were business partners and tenants in common as
to certain farm land. The evidence showed that the testator had a
weaker personality than his brother. The testator's brother made the
appointment with the attorney who drew up the testator's will and was
present when the will was executed. However, the brother's presence
was explained by the fact that he was simultaneously executing his own
will.29 The attorney did not observe any indication of undue influence
by the brother over the testator, and his physician testified that the
testator was "alert and well oriented."" The brother was the sole
beneficiary of the testator's will, and the testator's other siblings claimed
the brothers shared a confidential relationship and, as a result, a
rebuttable presumption arose that the testator was unduly influenced by

23. See Dyer, 272 Ga. at 263-65, 528 S.E.2d at 243; Kendrick-Owens, 271 Ga. at 731-32,
524 S.E.2d at 237; Brooks, 271 Ga. at 766-68, 523 S.E.2d at 862-63; Diaz, 271 Ga. at 74243, 524 S.E.2d at 220-21; Crumbley, 271 Ga. at 274-75, 517 S.E.2d at 786-87.
24. See Kendrick-Owens, 271 Ga. at 733, 524 S.E.2d at 238; Brooks, 271 Ga. at 770, 523
S.E.2d at 865; Diaz, 271 Ga. at 744-45, 524 S.E.2d at 222; Crumbley, 271 Ga. at 276, 517
S.E.2d at 787-88.
25. See Dyer, 272 Ga. at 265-66, 528 S.E.2d at 245; Kendrick-Owens, 271 Ga. at 732-33,
524 S.E.2d at 238; Diaz, 271 Ga. at 742, 524 S.E.2d at 220.
26. See Dyer, 272 Ga. at 265-66, 528 S.E.2d at 245; Kendrick-Owens, 271 Ga. at 732-33,
524 S.E.2d at 238; Brooks, 271 Ga. at 769-70, 523 S.E.2d at 864; Diaz, 271 Ga. at 743-44,
524 S.E.2d at 221-22; Crumbley, 271 Ga. at 276, 517 S.E.2d at 787-88.
27. 271 Ga. 274, 517 S.E.2d 786 (1999).
28. Id. at 275-76, 517 S.E.2d at 787. A confidential relationship is one in which one
individual is in a position to assert a controlling influence over another. O.C.G.A. § 23-2-58
(1982). In Georgia a presumption of undue influence may arise if the individual who takes
under the will was in a confidential relationship with the testator and actively participated
in procuring the will. Bryan v. Norton, 245 Ga. 347, 348-49, 265 S.E.2d 282, 284 (1980).
29. 271 Ga. at 274-76, 517 S.E.2d at 786-87.
30. Id. at 275, 517 S.E.2d at 787.
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his brother.31 The probate court found in the caveators' favor, but the
superior court and the supreme court ruled in favor of the surviving
brother. 2 The supreme court stated in this case that the mere fact the
testator and the sole beneficiary were brothers did not demonstrate the
existence of a confidential relationship. 3 The court also noted that the
evidence of the beneficiary's more dominant personality did not, in and
of itself, demand a finding that the brothers operated other than as
equals.34
In In re Estate of Diaz,3" the testator disinherited her children after
they tried to have her involuntarily committed. After her release from
the hospital, the testator told the sheriff's deputies that she did not want
to see her children again. She later resumed telephone communications
with them but told them that although she might forgive them, she
would never forget. About four months later, the testator was diagnosed
with cancer. She asked her attorney to draw up a will that left her
personal effects to her brother and the rest of the property to her
grandchildren. A week after signing the will, she signed a codicil that
stated that, due to recent events, her children and estranged husband
were to take nothing under her will. She died a few months later, and
the children challenged the will and codicil, claiming undue influence by
the brother and lack of testamentary capacity.36 The probate court
rejected their challenges, and the supreme court affirmed.37 The
supreme court noted that although the testator was suffering from
cancer when she executed her will, her doctor and the witnesses to the
will found her to be lucid and coherent. 3 As to the claim of undue
influence, the court pointed out that the mere fact the evidence showed
the brother had the opportunity to exercise the influence was not the
requisite clear and convincing evidence that the will had actually been
procured by undue influence.39
In Brooks v. Julian," a mother disinherited two of her four daughters when she became suspicious that one of them had abused her
authorization to take things from the mother's safe deposit box and the

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id.
Id., 517 S.E.2d at 787-88.
Id. at 276, 517 S.E.2d at 787.
Id.
271 Ga. 742, 524 S.E.2d 219 (1999).
Id. at 742-43, 524 S.E.2d at 220-21.
Id. at 745, 524 S.E.2d at 222.
Id. at 743-44, 524 S.E.2d at 221.
Id. at 744, 524 S.E.2d at 222.

40. 271 Ga. 766, 523 S.E.2d 862 (1999).
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second had sympathized with her.41 A jury found the other two
daughters had exerted undue influence over their mother.42 The
supreme court, however, found insufficient evidence to support that
finding. 43 The supreme court cited the testimony given by the attorney
and the attorney's assistant (both of whom had known the testator for
some time) that the testator appeared to know exactly what she was
doing when she changed her will and that she did not appear to be
acting other than freely and voluntarily.44 Although the record
contained evidence of suspicious circumstances, the court strongly stated
that suspicion cannot be allowed to supplant direct evidence on the
issue. 45
In Kendrick-Owens v. Clanton,46 the testator disinherited her older
children in favor of her youngest child. 47 A jury verdict set aside the
will on the ground of undue influence but the supreme court reversed,
finding insufficient evidence to sustain the verdict.4 The evidence
showed the youngest daughter had a domineering personality and had
driven the testator to the attorney's office on the two occasions on which
the testator discussed and executed her will. However, the attorney, the
other witness, the notary, and the testator's long-time physician all
testified the testator was lucid and of sound mind when she executed her
will. 49 The supreme court reiterated its emphasis on the circumstances
surrounding the time the will was executed, rather than prior or
subsequent times, and again stated that the mere opportunity to exercise
undue influence is insufficient to support a finding thereof.50
In Dyer v. Souther,5 a jury trial was held on the issues of whether
the testator had testamentary capacity, whether the will was properly
executed, and whether the will was the product of undue influence. At
the close of the evidence, the superior court directed verdicts in favor of
the propounder of the will on the latter two issues, and the jury decided
in the propounder's favor on the issue of testamentary capacity.52 The
caveator appealed the directed verdict and the supreme court reversed

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 767, 523 S.E.2d at 863.
Id. at 768, 523 S.E.2d at 862.
Id. at 768-70, 523 S.E.2d at 865.
Id. at 769, 523 S.E.2d at 865.
Id. at 769-70, 523 S.E.2d at 864.
271 Ga. 731, 524 S.E.2d 237 (1999).
Id. at 731-32, 524 S.E.2d at 237-38.
Id. at 731, 524 S.E.2d at 239.
Id. at 732-33, 524 S.E.2d at 238.
Id.
272 Ga. 263, 528 S.E.2d 242 (2000).
Id. at 263-64, 528 S.E.2d at 243-44.
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the directed verdict on the undue influence issue, finding that there was
"circumstantial evidence sufficient to raise the issue of undue influence." 3 This case contained many of the familiar elements of the
previously discussed undue influence cases. The testator, the last
survivor of eleven children, bequeathed all of her property to a greatnephew to the exclusion of more than seventy nieces and nephews. In
the event he did not survive the testator, the property was to go to his
mother, who was not a blood relative of the testator. The great-nephew,
Souther, was regularly at the testator's home, rented property from her,
and made the appointment for the testator with her attorney. The
testator lived with Souther's mother prior to entering a nursing home
and executed a power of attorney in his favor. She opened certificates
of deposit jointly intheir two names, and prior to his death, he cashed
them all. The testator exhibited a degree of mental impairment and
dementia around the time the will was executed. She could not read or
write or fill out a check. A relative testified that the testator had
complained to her about Souther and said Souther would not be getting
anything from her when she died. 4 The supreme court found this
evidence "belies the finding that the evidence demanded a verdict in
favor of the propounder."55
C.

Children Born Out of Wedlock

In In re Estate of Garrett,6 the Georgia Court of Appeals construed
the Georgia statute that defines the circumstances under which the
putative father of a child born out of wedlock may inherit from the
child.57 The decedent died intestate in 1997. The administrator of his
estate, who learned that a man named Phillips claimed to be the
decedent's father, filed a Petition to Determine Heirs in accordance with
Official Code of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.") section 53-2-21.18 The
probate court found Phillips was the decedent's father and thus one of
his heirs.59 The court of appeals reversed.6 ° The court of appeals
pointed out that Phillips had not signed the decedent's birth certificate
or a sworn affidavit of paternity, that there was no genetic evidence of

53. Id. at 265, 528 S.E.2d at 244.
54. Id. at 264-66, 528 S.E.2d at 244-45.
55. Id. at 266, 528 S.E.2d at 245.
56. 244 Ga. App. 65, 534 S.E.2d 843 (2000).
57. Id. at 66, 534 S.E.2d at 844.
58. Under the Code, an administrator may file a petition to determine the heirs of a
decedent. O.C.G.A. § 53-2-21 (1997).
59. 244 Ga. App. at 65, 534 S.E.2d at 844.
60. Id.
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paternity, and most importantly, that there had been no adjudication of
paternity during the decedent's lifetime.6' Phillips cited O.C.G.A.
section 53-2-4(b)(1), which allows the putative father of a child born out
of wedlock to inherit from the child if, among other things, a court has
entered an order declaring a child to be legitimate or "[a] court of
competent jurisdiction has otherwise entered a court order establishing
paternity."6 2 Phillips contended the finding by the probate court that
he was the decedent's father constituted a court order establishing
paternity.63 However, the court of appeals, citing Dunlap v. Moody'
and Rainey v. Chever,65 pointed out that a putative father loses his
right to inherit if the requirements of this code section are not met
during the child's lifetime.66 In Dunlap the court gave the rationale for
this requirement:
"[T]o rule otherwise ... would not permit an
illegitimate child, who is now dead, to dispute paternity."7
D. Appointment and Removal of PersonalRepresentatives
In Goolsby v. Estate of Williams,8 the court of appeals once again
faced the question of whether an individual was the common-law spouse
of the decedent and thus should serve as personal representative of the
decedent's estate.69 Common-law marriage was abolished in Georgia
for relationships entered into on or after January 1, 1997.70 However,
individuals who entered into relationships prior to that time continue to
claim to have been the common-law spouses of decedents."v One item
of evidence that is often offered to disprove the existence of a commonlaw marriage is the fact that the individuals filed tax returns separately
rather than as husband and wife.72 In Goolsby Lester claimed to be
the common-law husband of Williams, an intestate decedent, and applied
to be the administrator of her estate. Williams' mother, who was the
guardian of her minor children, objected and subpoenaed Goolsby, the

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
(1999);
72.
at 212,

Id. at 66, 534 S.E.2d at 844.
Id.
Id.
224 Ga. App. 38, 479 S.E.2d 456 (1996).
270 Ga. 519, 510 S.E.2d 823 (1999).
244 Ga. App. at 66, 534 S.E.2d at 844.
224 Ga. App. at 40, 479 S.E.2d at 458.
243 Ga. App. 890, 534 S.E.2d 559 (2000), cert. granted.
Id. at 890, 534 S.E.2d at 560.
O.C.G.A. § 19-3-1.1 (1997).
See, e.g., In re Estate of Wilson, 236 Ga. App. 496, 497-98, 512 S.E.2d 383, 385-86
In re Estate of Dunn, 236 Ga. App. 211, 211-12, 511 S.E.2d 575, 577 (1999).
See, e.g., Wilson, 236 Ga. App. at 497-98, 512 S.E.2d at 386; Dunn, 236 Ga. App.
511 S.E.2d at 577.
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Director of the Income Tax Division of the Georgia Department of
Revenue, to produce copies of the decedent's income tax returns in order
to show the decedent had filed returns as a single person. Goolsby
claimed the information was confidential and protected from disclosure
under O.C.G.A. section 48-7-60(a).7" The probate court required the
production of the returns, but the court of appeals reversed this order. 4
The court of appeals relied on the supreme court's "clear policy favoring
nondisclosure," as evidenced in cases in which disclosure was required
only when the integrity of the returns themselves was directly in
issue.75
The remaining cases in this subsection involved the removal of a
personal representative. In In re Estate of Jackson,76 Willie Jackson
filed a petition to remove Ira Jackson as administrator of his father's
estate ten years after the estate had been opened. When the petition
was filed, Ira was an inmate in the federal penitentiary in Montgomery,
Alabama. The probate court granted the petition to remove Ira and also
ordered him to redeed to the estate the property he had previously
deeded to himself.77 Ira appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed his
removal.78 Ira contended that the probate court abused its discretion
in that it did not make any finding of waste, mismanagement, or lack of
fitness to serve as administrator.7 9 The court of appeals addressed this
issue, even though it found that Ira failed to support or address the
issue in his brief.80 The court of appeals noted that Ira had filed no
annual returns, and thus the probate court did not abuse its discretion
in removing him.8 ' Ira also argued that the court should have granted
his requested continuance until his projected release from prison so that
he could present his case in person. 2 The court of appeals found the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the continuance, which
was requested only a week before the scheduled hearing and contained
no showing that he would actually be released from prison on the
projected date.83

73. 243 Ga. App. at 890, 534 S.E.2d at 560.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. 241 Ga. App. 392, 526 S.E.2d 884 (1999).
77. Id. at 392-93, 526 S.E.2d at 885-86.
78. Id. at 392, 526 S.E.2d at 885.
79. Id. at 394, 526 S.E.2d at 886.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 394-95, 526 S.E.2d at 886-87.
82. Id. at 394, 526 S.E.2d at 886.
83. Id. at 394-95, 526 S.E.2d at 886-87.
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In Crump v. McDonald,84 Gussie Butler named McDonald (her son)
and H.P. Butler as coexecutors of her estate. Butler disclaimed his
share of her estate. Crump, H.P. Butler's daughter, filed an action to
have both McDonald and Butler removed as coexecutors. Butler died
before Crump's petition was ruled upon, so Crump proceeded against
McDonald. The probate court denied her petition, so she appealed to the
superior court, and a jury returned a special verdict against her. She
moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict ("j.n.o.v.") and was
denied. She again appealed, arguing the requested orders for directed
verdict (which she had requested early on in the trial) and j.n.o.v were
proper whenever a fiduciary has admitted facts that show a breach of
fiduciary duty.8" The court of appeals affirmed the denial of the
8
j.n.o.v.
The standard applied by the court of appeals was whether
there was "any evidence" to support the jury verdict.87 Crump presented evidence at trial indicating there was some mismanagement of the
estate: McDonald never inventoried the estate; he was late in filing the
estate income tax return and thus incurred a penalty; he withheld
information necessary for a valuation of' the estate assets from the
accountant for five years; he deeded the testator's house to his mother,
but he actually had renovated it for his own use and paid for utilities
and maintenance from the estate funds; he maintained the estate's cash
in low-interest accounts in a bank in which he had an interest as an
officer, shareholder, and director; and he failed to respond to Crump's
numerous requests for an accounting. While McDonald admitted these
allegations, he offered a variety of excuses as mitigating circumstances.
For example, he said he did not have the estate valued because he
believed it was under $600,000; he did not think the will required him
to give accountings to the beneficiaries while the administration of the
estate was pending; and he filed the income tax returns late because
Butler would not sign them."8 The court of appeals concluded that
"some evidence" existed to support the jury's verdict.8 9 The court then
pointed out that, even if the jury had found a breach of fiduciary duty,
the court still had the discretion to determine that McDonald should not
be removed as executor.9 °

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

239 Ga. App. 647, 520 S.E.2d 283 (1999).
Id. at 647, 520 S.E.2d at 284-85.
Id., 520 S.E.2d at 285.
Id. at 647-48, 520 S.E.2d at 285.
Id. at 648, 520 S.E.2d at 285.
Id.
Id. at 649, 520 S.E.2d at 285.
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In In re Estate of Williams,9 Collis and Arthur Williams were
divorced in 1996, and Collis subsequently filed a contempt action against
him for failing to pay child support. The next month, both Collis and
Arthur's daughter from a prior relationship died. Arthur was appointed
administrator of his former wife's estate and used money from her estate
to pay for his daughter's funeral. Collis' sister petitioned to have Arthur
removed as administrator and the probate court granted her petition,
because Arthur misused the estate funds, and because he had a conflict
of interest due to his past-due child support.92 The court of appeals
found that Arthur failed to carry his burden on appeal because he did
not prove affirmatively that he no longer owed any child support.93 The
court then pointed out that, even if Arthur did not owe child support, the
use of the estate funds to pay his daughter's funeral expenses alone
justified his removal as administrator.94
The tragic case of In re Estate of Davis"' reflects many sad elements
of today's society. The decedent committed suicide after being accused
of molesting two of his brother's children. The decedent's will named his
father, Davis, who was an "attorney and the drafter of the will, as
executor and sole residuary beneficiary. Davis arrived at the scene of
the suicide shortly after his son's death and was told by police that they
had found sexually explicit material in the son's home. Davis later
searched the house and found videotapes, magazines, and pornographic
material that had been printed off the Internet. Davis claimed none of
these materials would constitute child pornography. He placed the
materials in a storage facility and then had a trash collector dispose of
them.9" Davis also testified that he searched his son's computer and
deleted numerous pornographic files. He explained at trial that he had
previously attended an attorney general's seminar on pedophilia and
thus knew what types of pornography would be relevant in the
molestation case. Davis stated that he did not discover that kind of
pornography, although later testimony by computer experts showed a
large amount of the deleted material consisted of sexual pictures and
stories involving underage boys. The parents of the molested children
informed Davis they were pursuing a cause of action against the estate
based on the molestation allegations. When Davis received notice of the

91. 241 Ga. App. 17, 525 S.E.2d 742 (1999).
92. Id. at 17, 525 S.E.2d at 743.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 17-18, 525 S.E.2d at 743-44.
95. 243 Ga. App. 58, 532 S.E.2d 169 (2000).
96. Id. at 58-59, 532 S.E.2d at 170-71. Davis claimed the police detective told him this
was legal. Id., 532 S.E.2d at 171.
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claims, he paid himself $200,000 in fees and then, six months later, told
the parents that he could not fund trusts established under the will for
their children because of the pending action. The parents then filed a
petition to have Davis removed as executor, and the probate court
granted it. 97 The court of appeals affirmed.98 Citing O.C.G.A. section

53-7-55 and cases construing its predecessor statute,99 the court of
appeals stated that the probate court has broad discretion to remove an
executor and that this probate court properly found the "good cause"
required by the current statute °° in that Davis had destroyed evidence
that would have had value in the molestation suit. 1 1 The court of
appeals declined Davis' request that it issue an advisory opinion as to
how the probate0 2court should go about appointing a successor personal
representative.

Guardianships
In Hayes v. Clark,' the court of appeals affirmed a directed verdict
ordering Ms. Clark's mother, Ms. Hayes, to pay $12,139.94 to Clark as
settlement of an express trust created in Clark's favor.'0 4 Clark was
in a car accident in New Jersey when she was a minor. In the subsequent personal injury lawsuit, the New Jersey court entered judgment
in Clark's favor and directed that $5,887.50 be handled as follows:
"Disbursed to the guardian and mother of [Clark] to be held by [the
mother] in trust for her daughter until her daughter's 18th birthday; and
any bond of said guardian is hereby waived."0 5 Hayes deposited the
money in her own account. When Clark reached age eighteen, Hayes
said she herself had been unable to support Clark financially, so she had
used Clark's funds to support her.'
The court of appeals applied Georgia law as it had "no proof of the law
of the state of New Jersey."'0 7 Hayes first claimed the New Jersey
court order did not create a valid express trust because the trustee was
not given active duties to perform. Rather, she said, the New Jersey
E.

97. Id. at 59, 63, 532 S.E.2d at 171, 173.
98. Id. at 60, 532 S.E.2d at 172.
99. Prior to 1998 the provisions ofO.C.G.A. § 53-7-55 appeared at O.C.G.A. § 53-7-148.
100. O.C.G.A. § 53-7-55 allows the court to cite a personal representative to appear if
it appears "that good cause may exist to revoke the letters of a personal representative."
101. 243 Ga. App. at 60-61, 532 S.E.2d at 172-73.
102. Id. at 63, 532 S.E.2d at 174.
103. 242 Ga. App. 411, 530 S.E.2d 38 (2000).
104. Id. at 414, 530 S.E.2d at 41-42.
105. Id. at 411, 530 S.E.2d at 39.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 412, 530 S.E.2d at 39.
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court merely appointed her as guardian of her child." 8 The court of
appeals pointed out, however, that although the New Jersey court
recognized Hayes as her child's natural guardian, it specifically ordered
that the property be held in trust.' 9 The court noted that the trustee's duties "may be specified in the writing [that creates the express
trust] or [may be] implied by law.""'
Hayes next claimed the New
Jersey court could not be the settlor of a trust."' The court of appeals
disagreed with this claim also, stating: "Because the court had legal
capacity to transfer title to the property, it could direct the guardian to
hold the money in trust for the child."" 2
Hayes then tried to defend her actions by citing Pettigrew v. Williams,"' a Georgia case in which a mother, as guardian for her minor
children, used property received by them after their father's death to
support them during their minority."4 Though the mother had filed
annual returns, the court held that the annual returns did not bar a
child from suing the guardian upon reaching majority, but also noted
that, when a parent is unable to support a child, an allowance for the
child's support may be made from the guardianship estate." 5 In
relying on this guardianship case, Hayes seemed to be confusing the
difference between her role as a guardian and as a trustee. Although
she was both her child's guardian and the trustee of the trust set up for
the child's benefit, the amounts at issue were subject to the terms of the
trust, which did not allow any encroachment."' The court of appeals
relied not on Pettigrew but on Shipp v. McCowen." 7 The court noted
that Shipp also involved a mother who had spent her children's property,
which was inherited from their father, to support the children during
their minority."18 The court in Shipp held that, if the use of that
property was necessary, a guardian should have been appointed who
then should have made application to the probate court to encroach on

108. Id., 530 S.E.2d at 39-40.
109. Id. at 411, 530 S.E.2d at 39. In ordering the property to be placed in trust, the
New Jersey court also relieved Hayes from filing a bond as guardian. Id.
110. Id. at 412, 530 S.E.2d at 39. The court cited O.C.G.A. § 53-12-20(a), (b) (1997).
Id.
111. Id. at 412, 530 S.E.2d at 39.
112. Id., 530 S.E.2d at 39-40. As authority for this statement, the Court cited O.C.G.A.
§ 53-12-22 (1997).
113. 65 Ga. App. 576, 16 S.E.2d 120 (1941).
114. 242 Ga. App. at 412, 530 S.E.2d at 40.
115. Id. at 413, 530 S.E.2d at 40.
116. Id.
117. 147 Ga. 711, 95 S.E. 251 (1918).
118. 242 Ga. App. at 413, 530 S.E.2d at 40.
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the corpus, justifying its "harsh and stern rule" as "the only rule that
will safeguard the estate of minors."" 9 Therefore, the court in Hayes
affirmed the lower court's order. 2 °
In In re Petition of Roscoe, 2 ' the court of appeals clarified those
circumstances under which an individual may be appointed the
temporary guardian of a child. 2 2 Georgia law allows the probate court
to appoint a temporary guardian for a minor "when the minor is alleged
by the person having actual physical custody of such minor to be in need
of a guardian."12'
The appointment can take place regardless of
whether the child's parents consent. 24 However, if a parent indicates
a preference in the choice of who will serve as the child's guardian, that
preference must be honored unless good cause is shown to appoint a
different individual. 12
Ms. Roscoe lived with A.T.P., a minor, and
A.T.P.'s mother. Roscoe applied to become the temporary guardian of
the child, and the child's mother agreed and relinquished her guardianship rights, as provided in O.C.G.A. section 29-4-4.1.126 Roscoe stated
in court that the reason she applied to be the child's guardian was to
make the child eligible for coverage under her health insurance policy.
The lower court held this alone was insufficient to make the child "in
need of a guardian" and thus denied the guardianship.'27 Roscoe
contended the court did not have discretion to deny a temporary
guardianship if the child's parent consented. 12 The court of appeals
noted that while O.C.G.A. section 29-4-4.1 requires a court to honor the
parent's preference in the choice of a temporary guardian and requires
the court to dissolve a temporary guardianship at the parent's request,
the statute gives the probate court discretion to decide whether a child
is in need of a guardian. 29 The court of appeals then examined
whether the probate court abused its discretion by refusing to grant a

119. Id. at 414, 530 S.E.2d at 40 (quoting Shipp, 147 Ga. at 714, 95 S.E. at 253).
120. 242 Ga. App. at 414, 530 S.E.2d at 40-41.
121. 242 Ga. App. 440, 529 S.E.2d 897 (2000).
122. Id. at 440, 529 S.E.2d at 898.
123. O.C.G.A. § 29-4-4.1(a)(1) (1997 & Supp. 2000).
124. Id. The parents must receive notice of the application for temporary guardianship,
and the guardianship will not be allowed if either parent objects. Id.
Also, the
guardianship will be dissolved upon the application of either parent. O.C.G.A. § 29-4-4. 1(c).
See infra text accompanying notes 186-87 for a discussion of the 2000 amendment to this
subsection of the statute.
125. O.C.G.A. § 29-4-4.1(a)(3) (1997).
126. Id. § 29-4-4.1(a)(1).
127. 242 Ga. App. at 440, 529 S.E.2d at 899.
128. Id. at 440-41, 529 S.E.2d at 897-98.
129. Id. at 441, 529 S.E.2d at 898.
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temporary guardianship in this case and determined it did not.'3 ° The
court of appeals noted: "Health insurance is an important benefit for a
child, but we can find no precedent for the proposition that a child who
lacks health insurance is in need of a guardian for that reason
alone." 3'
F

PurchaseMoney Resulting TRusts

In Burt v. Skrzyniarz,'3 2 the supreme court clarified the circumstances under which a court would enforce the type of implied trust known as
a "purchase money resulting trust."'33 Georgia law recognizes two
types of implied trusts: resulting trusts and constructive trusts.'34 A
purchase money resulting trust is defined as "a resulting trust implied
for the benefit of the person paying consideration for the transfer to
another person of legal title to real or personal property."'3 5 One
person's payment of the purchase price for property and another's taking
title to the property creates a rebuttable presumption that the holder of
title is holding it in trust for the purchaser. 3
In this case Burt
claimed his former girlfriend, Skryniarz, held certain property in a
purchase money resulting trust for his benefit. Burt and Skryniarz
began dating in 1990 and took possession of a home as tenants in
common in 1997. The sales contract and warranty deed named them
both as grantees, and the parties took joint possession of the property.
When they separated, Burt claimed he had a ninety-nine percent
interest in the property under the purchase money resulting trust
theory.137 The supreme court affirmed the trial court's finding that the
parties held the property in equal shares as tenants in common and not
as parties to a purchase money resulting trust. ' The court first noted
that a presumption exists that parties who take property as tenants in
common take in equal shares and that this presumption can only be
rebutted by clear and convincing evidence.' 3 9 The court called this

130. Id.
131. Id., 529 S.E.2d at 899.
132. 272 Ga. 35, 526 S.E.2d 848 (2000).
133. Id. at 37-38, 526 S.E.2d at 850-51.
134. O.C.G.A. § 53-12-90 (1997).
135. Id. § 53-12-92(a).
136. Id. § 53-12-92(b). This presumption is rebuttable by a preponderance of the
evidence. Id. However, if the parties are husband and wife, parent and child, or siblings,
the presumption is that the purchaser gave the property to the one who took title. Id. § 5312-92(c).
137. 272 Ga. at 35-36, 526 S.E.2d at 849-50.
138. Id. at 35, 526 S.E.2d at 849.
139. Id. at 36, 526 S.E.2d at 850.
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axiom "a fundamental precept of the law [that] should not be easily
subjected to uncertainty or undoing." 4 ° The court then addressed
Burt's contention that the trial court's instruction regarding the tenancy
in common was incompatible with its instruction regarding whether a
purchase money resulting trust existed.14 ' The court pointed out that,
in order for a purchase money resulting trust to be established, it must
be shown that both parties contemplated that type of trust. 42 The
agreement between the parties may either appear in an express
agreement or may be implied by the surrounding circumstances, but the
43
agreement must have existed at the time the purchase took place.
Most importantly, the parties cannot intend simultaneously to create a
tenancy in common and a purchase money resulting trust. Thus, insofar
as Burt had conceded a tenancy in common was created, the purchase
money resulting trust could not exist simultaneously.'"
G. Powers of Attorney
A power of attorney creates an agency relationship between the
principal and the attorney in fact, who is authorized to act on the
principal's behalf. 45 In Stewart v. Stewart,146 Mrs. Core, who had
suffered a stroke, gave a power of attorney to her stepmother, Mrs.
Stewart. Mrs. Stewart sold certain property that she owned jointly with
Core and invested the proceeds in subordinated debentures issued by
Stewart Finance Co., the wholly-owned company of defendant. Mrs.
Stewart designated defendant as co-owner of the debentures with right
of survivorship. Four months later Mrs. Stewart and Core both executed
general powers of attorney in favor of defendant. Core died the next
year, and Mrs. Stewart entered a nursing home. Defendant, using the
power of attorney, opened a joint Merrill Lynch account in both his and
Mrs. Stewart's names. He deposited in the account stock owned
individually by Mrs. Stewart, then sold the stock and made personal
investments with the proceeds. Later that same year, defendant
cancelled the subordinated debentures he held jointly with Mrs. Stewart

140. Id.
141. Id. at 37, 526 S.E.2d at 850.
142. Id., 526 S.E.2d at 851.

143. Id.
144. Id., 526 S.E.2d at 851.
145. Georgia law provides that "[t]he relation of principal and agent arises wherever
one person, expressly or by implication, authorizes another to act for him or subsequently
ratifies the acts of another in his behalf." O.C.G.A. § 10-6-1 (2000). Georgia has
established a statutory form that may be used to create a power of attorney. Id. §§ 10-6140 to -142.
146. 240 Ga. App. 573, 524 S.E.2d 267 (1999).
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and credited them to his company's capital account. When Mrs. Stewart
died, plaintiffs brought an action against defendant, both individually
and as assignees of the estates of Mrs. Stewart and Core. They sought
to recover the funds held in the survivorship account and alleged fraud,
conversion, and breach of fiduciary duty. The actions on behalf of Core's
estate were dismissed because plaintiffs were not beneficiaries under her
will, but the action on behalf of Mrs. Stewart's estate proceeded to a jury
trial. The jury found the asset transfers made by defendant to himself
proper because Mrs. Stewart intended the actions of her attorney-infact. 4 ' The court of appeals affirmed. 4 '
The court first cited O.C.G.A. section 7-1-813 for the proposition that
"[s]ums remaining on deposit at the death of a party to a joint account
belong to the surviving party."' 49 The court then examined whether
the duty of loyalty implicit in a power of attorney prohibits the agent
from making gifts to himself. 5 ° The court noted that gifts are not
foreclosed if: 1) there was no fraud in obtaining the power of attorney;
2) the power of attorney expressly included the power to transfer stocks;
and 3) the evidence shows that the principal indicated the intent that
On the third point, the court cited
the transfer should occur.'
evidence that Mrs. Stewart was "fully rational and alert" during some
of her days in the nursing home. 1 2 The evidence also showed that,
when she created the power of attorney, Mrs. Stewart did not limit the
use of the funds she jointly owned with defendant, other than that they
be used to support herself and her stepdaughter during their lives, and
that she intended defendant take whatever funds remained at her
death. 13 The court concluded "that there is evidence that Mrs.
Stewart intended that the defendant should receive the gifts which
resulted from the defendant's transfer of their subordinated debentures
and the sale of stock she owned individually."5 4
In Allen v. Dominy,'55 during his last illness, Mr. Dominy gave a
general power of attorney to his sister, Ms.. Allen. His wife also gave
Allen a limited power of attorney. In conversations with Mr. Dominy,
Allen agreed she would take title to his real property to ensure that Mrs.
Dominy would be provided for after Mr. Dominy's death. Allen then had

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id. at 573-74, 524 S.E.2d at 268-69.
Id. at 578, 524 S.E.2d at 271.
Id. at 575, 524 S.E.2d at 269 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 7-1-813(a) (1997)).
Id. at 574-75, 524 S.E.2d at 269.
Id. at 575, 524 S.E.2d at 269.
Id., 524 S.E.2d at 270.
Id. at 575-76, 524 S.E.2d at 270.
Id. at 576, 524 S.E.2d at 270.

155. 272 Ga. 399, 529 S.E.2d 363 (2000).
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her attorney draw up a deed conveying fee simple to her. She obtained
her brother's signature on the deed, but she did not record it until after
he died. Allen was named the executor of her brother's will. After her
husband died, Mrs. Dominy revoked the power of attorney she had given
Allen upon discovering Allen had moved Dominy's certificates of deposit
("CDs") and checking account to the bank where Allen worked. Mrs.
Dominy then applied for a year's support from her husband's estate,
apparently in the form of her husband's real property, but Allen, as
executor, opposed the application. Mrs. Dominy then filed an action to
set aside the deed to Allen. The trial court found that Allen breached a
fiduciary duty she owed to both parties as their agent. Her actions in
procuring the deed for herself and then opposing the year's support
award violated her promise to her brother to use the property for his
wife's benefit.'56 - The supreme court affirmed the judgment and
pointed out that, even if Allen had not used the limited power given her
by Mrs. Dominy to procure the deed, Mrs. Dominy was arguably a third57
party beneficiary of the agreement between Mr. Dominy and Allen.'
Even if the evidence did not support a finding of Mrs. Dominy as a thirddeed set aside in
party beneficiary, she still was authorized to have the
15 8
her representative capacity as Mr. Dominy's widow.
H.

Joint Bank Accounts

In Parker v. Kennon,"59 the court of appeals emphasized the nature
of the relationship between parties to a joint bank account while all of
the parties are alive. 60 In this case the guardian of a stroke victim's
person and property sued the victim's three daughters for converting
their mother's funds. Prior to her stroke, the mother purchased two CDs
with her individual funds. The CDs were styled as joint accounts with
the mother and a daughter. The daughters cashed in the CDs and
opened accounts in their own names.' 6 ' The court of appeals affirmed
the trial court's judgment that the daughters wrongfully converted the
CDs. ' 2 The court cited O.C.G.A. section 7-1-812(a), which provides
that a joint account belongs, during the lifetime of the parties, to each

156. Id. at 399-400, 529 S.E.2d at 363-64.
157. Id. at 400, 529 S.E.2d at 364.
158. Id.
159. 242 Ga. App. 627, 530 S.E.2d 527 (2000).
160. Id. at 628-29, 530 S.E.2d at 529-30. A "joint account" is one that is "payable on
request to one or more of two or more parties, whether or not mention is made of any right
of survivorship." O.C.G.A. § 7-1-810(4) (1997).
161. 242 Ga. App. at 627-28, 530 S.E.2d at 528-29.
162. Id. at 631, 530 S.E.2d at 531.
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party in proportion to her net contributions, absent clear and convincing
This statute creates a presumption that
evidence to the contrary.1'
an individual who funds a joint account does not intend to make a gift
of the funds during her lifetime. The court noted that it was "absolutely
undisputed" that the daughters had the right to withdraw the funds
from the CDs: "[Tihat is the very essence of a joint account."'
However, the "daughters had no authority to use the funds for their own
personal benefit."" 5
L

Attorney's Duty to Heirs of the Estate

A question that remains unanswered in Georgia fiduciary law is
whether an attorney who has been hired by a personal representative
represents the personal representative, the estate, or the beneficiaries
of the estate. This issue was raised in Bowen v. Hunter,Maclean, Exley
& Dunn,16 but the court of appeals decided the case on grounds that
did not necessitate giving an answer to the question.'6 7 In this case
the decedent's mother and sister sued an attorney and his law firm for
professional malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, conspiracy,
fraud, and conversion. The attorney and his firm represented the
decedent's widow in her administration of her husband's estate.
Plaintiffs asserted the attorney should have given them a copy of the
decedent's prenuptial agreement, which they stated barred the decedent's widow from inheriting from him, thus leaving them as the sole
Plaintiffs claimed that at the very least, the
heirs of his estate.'
attorney should have notified them of their potential interest in the
estate.16 9 The attorney responded that he was aware of the contract
but could not deliver it without his client's permission. The mother and
sister eventually sued the widow, and they settled by dividing the estate,
one-half to the widow and one-half to the mother and sister. Nine

163. Id. at 628-29, 530 S.E.2d at 529. When one of the parties to a joint account dies,
the account "belong[s] to the surviving party or parties as against the estate of the
decedent, unless there is clear and convincing evidence of a different intention at the time
the account is created." O.C.G.A. § 7-1-813 (1997).
164. 242 Ga. App. at 629, 530 S.E.2d at 530.
165. Id.
166. 241 Ga. App. 204, 525 S.E.2d 744 (1999).
167. Id. at 206-08, 525 S.E.2d at 748-49.
168. Id. at 204, 525 S.E.2d at 746.
169. Id. at 204-05, 525 S.E.2d at 746-47. The mother and sister became aware of the
prenuptial agreement before the estate was closed but waited for several months before
asking the attorney about it. Id., 525 S.E.2d at 747.
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months after the settlement, the mother and sister sued the attorney
and his firm.17
The trial court bifurcated the issues under the theory that a jury had
to determine whether the prenuptial agreement was valid before
plaintiffs could make a claim against the attorney. The jury found the
agreement was not valid, so the trial court entered judgment for the
attorney on the theory that plaintiffs had never been the attorney's
clients, and thus the attorney owed no duty to them. The mother and
sister did not appeal the trial court's finding that no attorney-client
relationship existed between them and the attorney. However, they
argued the attorney, as attorney for the administrator of the estate, had
a fiduciary duty to them as potential or possible heirs, even if they did
not turn out to be actual heirs.17' The court of appeals examined the
facts to determine whether a fiduciary or confidential relationship72
existed, even though none had been created by law or by contract.'
The mother and sister said they trusted the attorney when he originally
told them they "had no interest in the prenuptial agreement," and thus
the attorney owed them a fiduciary duty.173 The court pointed out,
however, that the mere existence of a close personal advisory relationship does not establish a confidential relationship unless "one party is
74
so situated as to exercise a controlling influence over" the other.'
The court found no controlling influence.' 5 After affirming various
evidentiary rulings made by the trial court, the court of appeals
examined whether the trial court erred in denying the mother and
sister's motion for directed verdict on the ground that the widow failed
to rescind the prenuptial agreement once she became aware it was
invalid. 176 The court of appeals noted the widow could not "rescind" her
1 77
only benefit under the contract, which was marriage to her husband.

170. Id., 525 S.E.2d at 746-47.
171. Id. at 207, 525 S.E.2d at 748.
172. Id. at 207-08, 525 S.E.2d at 748.
173. Id. at 208, 525 S.E.2d at 749.
174. Id. The court cited O.C.G.A. § 23-2-58, which is discussed supra at text
accompanying notes 27-34. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 209, 525 S.E.2d at 750.
177. Id.
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2000 LEGISLATION

A.

7tle to Real Property of Intestate Decedent
Prior to the revision of the Probate Code that became effective in 1998,
Georgia law provided that, if an individual died intestate, title to that
individual's real property vested in the individual's heirs, subject to
administration. 17 The revised code changed that rule so that title to
an intestate decedent's real property vests in the personal representative, 179 just as in the case of an individual who dies with a valid
will. 180 The revised code also provided that, if no administrator was
appointed within three years of an intestate decedent's death, the title
to the real property vested in the decedent's heirs.'
In 2000 the Georgia legislature attempted to change the rule 1 of
82
vesting back to the rule as it existed prior to the 1998 revision.
However, the amendment adopted by the legislature did not restore the
old law but instead created yet another rule for the passage of title to an
intestate decedent's real property by providing that an intestate
decedent's property "shall vest immediately in the decedent's heirs at
law, subject to divestment by the appointment of an administrator of the
estate." 8 ' There is no time limit within which an administrator must
be appointed.8 4 Thus, under the amended statute, it would seem that
the only way to secure title to real property that could not later be
divested would be to have an administrator appointed for the estate.
B.

Notice to Temporary Guardian
Section 29-4-4.1 of the O.C.G.A. provides for the appointment of a
temporary guardian for a minor, with or without the minor's parents'
consent. 185 However, the temporary guardianship will be dissolved
immediately upon the request of either parent, assuming the parent is

178. O.C.G.A. § 53-4-8 (1997), amended by O.C.G.A. § 53-2-7(a) (1997 & Supp. 2000).
179. O.C.G.A. § 53-2-7(a) (1997 & Supp. 2000).
180. Id. § 53-8-15.
181. Id. § 53-2-7(b) (Supp. 2000).
182. Id. § 53-2-7(b).
183. Id. § 53-2-7(a).
184. The 2000 amendment repealed the provision, which appeared in O.C.G.A. § 53-27(b), that stated that the property would vest in the heirs if no administrator was
appointed within three years of the decedent's death.
185. See supra text accompanying notes 121-31 for a discussion of the circumstances
under which a temporary guardian may be appointed.
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the child's natural guardian."8 6 The statute was amended in 2000 to
require that the temporary guardian be given notice and the opportunity
to object if the parents seek to terminate the temporary guardianship. 7 If an objection is filed, the probate court is to transfer the case
to the juvenile court for a determination of whether the termination of
the temporary guardianship is in the best interest of the child.'

186.
187.
188.

O.C.G.A. § 29-4-4.1(c) (1997).
Id. § 29-4-4.1(c) (Supp. 2000).
Id.
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